
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THREAT RECOGNITION


AND RESPONSE

(VOLUME 1)

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A.T. ROSS

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
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THREAT RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE (VOLUME 1)

A.T. Ross

SUMMARY

This note is published as two Volumes. Volume 1 describes a model of threat recognition based upon patterns and trends discerned from a study of major international crises and conflicts which occurred in the period 1938 to 1973.

It also describes, in broad terms, the diplomatic and defence preparation activities which national governments undertook in response to their threat perceptions.

Finally, Volume 1 records and discusses the durations of the various threat recognition phases defined in the threat recognition model, and lists in Annex A the primary national interests identified by governments in the conflicts studied and for which they ultimately fought.

Volume 2 documents the historical analysis of the case studies of international conflicts between 1938 and 1973 upon which the model and results of Volume 1 are based.

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PREFACE


CSE Note 53 is a record of research performed at Central Studies Establishment on the processes by which national governments perceive the emergence of threats to one or more of their national interests, and the associated diplomatic and defence preparation activities they undertake in response to these threat perceptions.

The study complements historically based lead-time studies, by providing some basis for comparison with the times governments actually experienced for defence preparation and expansion in conflict and crisis situations.

The work provides a contribution to the general defence discussion on warning times and defence preparation times. It does not provide a tool or data base for the objective prediction of future warning times.

CSE Note 53 supersedes an earlier CSE Working Paper 'Warning Time 1' of December 1975.





CONTENES

| | Page No. |
|--|----------|
| BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF CSE WARNING TIME STUDIES | 1 |
| Early Thinking on Warning Time | 1 |
| The Force Expansion Lead-Time Pilot Study | 2 |
| CSE Force Expansion Study | 3 |
| CSE Warning Time 1 Study | 4 |
| CSE Threat Recognition and Response Study | 5 |
| | |
| A PROCESS OF THREAT RECOGNITION | 6 |
| National Warning | 6 |
| Re-Definition of the Threat Maxim | 7 |
| General Hostile Intent | 8 |
| Specific Hostile Intent | 8 |
| General Capability | 9 |
| Specific Capability | 9 |
| Discussion of the Threat Recognition Phases | 13 |
| | |
| THE STATISTICS OF WARNING TIME | 13 |
| Introduction | 13 |
| Objective Use of Warning Time Statistics | 17 |
| Subjective Use of Warning Time Statistics | 17 |

CONTENTS (Cont'd)

| | | Page | No. |
|-----|--|------|-----|
| _ | PERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE SEQUENCE OF THREAT COGNITION | 1 | 8 |
| | Introduction | 1 | 8 |
| | Activities Associated with Notional Threat | 1 | 9 |
| | Activities Associated with Perceived Threat | 2 | 0 |
| | Activities Associated with the Specific Threat Phase | 2 | 3 |
| | Duration of Specific Threat Phase | 2 | 4 |
| SUM | MARY | 2 | 4 |
| ACK | NOWLEDGEMENTS | 2 | 5 |
| | | | |
| | LIST OF TABLES | | |
| 1. | THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES 1938-73 | 1 | 4 |
| 2. | SUMMARY STATISTICS-THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS | 1 | 5 |
| | LIST OF FIGURES | | |
| 1. | POINTS IN THE THREAT RECOGNITION SEQUENCE | 1 | 0 |
| 2. | DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THREAT IN THE THREAT RECOGNITION SEQUENCE | 1 | 1 |
| 3. | THE THREAT RECOGNITION MODEL | 1 | 2 |
| 4. | FREQUENCY HISTOGRAMS OF THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS | 1 | 5 |
| 5. | SAMPLE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR NOTIONAL THREAT PHASE DURATIONS | 1 | 6 |
| 6. | SAMPLE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCEIVED AND SPECIFIC THREAT PHASE DURATIONS | 1 | 6 |

CONTENTS (Cont'd)

LIST OF ANNEXES

A. CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST FOR CONFLICTS AND CRISES 1938-73

THREAT RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE

BACKGROUND TO AND GENESIS OF CSE WARNING TIME STUDIES

Early Thinking on Warning Time

1. The rationale for, and the beginnings of CSE's involvement in Warning Time Studies, can be traced back to the first half of 1973. A minute (25/5/73) covering a paper entitled 'Build-up of Forces from Threat Perception' was sent from FASSEC (now FASFDA) to the then Secretary of the Department of Defence. The paper defined the terms, warning time, effective warning time and lead-time as follows:

'In dealing with the concept of build-up of an operational force from threat perception the following concepts are normally used:

- a. the <u>warning time</u>, which is that time from the perception of precursors of a threat to the time at which it is judged that the threat will require operational response;
- b. the <u>effective warning time</u>, which is less than the warning time by the time taken up to a decision to take note of the precursors and to adopt some relevant measures to develop a response;
- c. the <u>lead-time</u>, which is the time required to develop a force capability or components of a force structure.'
- 2. The paper went on to state that 'the time difference between warning and effective warning cannot be specified,' but this definitional problem was resolved in the final draft (29/6/73) which (in order to be consistent with the terminology of the 1973 Strategic Basis) now defined warning time as
 - 'the time from Government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it is judged it will require operational response.'
- 3. There is no further development of the concept of warning time, the rest of the paper being devoted to consideration of lead-times.
- 4. This aspect of the paper was commented upon by the then Secretary of the Department of Air 7/6/73 who stated:
 - '2. The draft paper states in paragraph 1 that the subject being considered is the concept of build-up of an operational force from threat perception. It recognizes that there are two distinct phases: the time from the perception of precursors of a threat to the time it is judged an operational response will be required; and the lead-time to build-up force capability.

3. The latter aspect of build-up dominates the paper and is discussed at great length; the former aspect is, however, of at least equal importance, and is, in many respects, the more difficult aspect on which to reach judgements.'

The Force Expansion Lead-Time Pilot Study

- 5. No subsequent drafts of the original paper, developed the concept of measurement of warning time any further. However, the minute from FASSEC to the Secretary, Department of Defence, covering the final draft (29/6/73), expressed a wish that a pilot study be undertaken of the methodology involved in the examination of lead-times. This pilot study was carried out and a report on the study was completed in October 1973, entitled "Report on Force Expansion Lead-Time Pilot Study". The report was compiled under FASSEC leadership by a team with membership from Secretariat division, CSE and Scientific Adviser to the Military Board (SAMB).
- 6. The pilot study report used the same definitions of warning time and lead-time as did the final draft of the paper on the build-up of forces from threat perception. It did not develop the concept of warning times further, to any great extent. Instead it stated that:

'Warning time represents the upper limit of the time available to develop the necessary force or components of a force before an operational response is required and determines the atmosphere in which expansion against a given threat occurs. Relationships between warning times and lead-times are complex and difficult to analyze without making equivocal assumptions, since the concept of warning time is highly dependent on the efficiency of intelligence, the accuracy of strategic views and the nature and timeliness of decision-making processes. The difficulties associated with the effective synchronisation of the above factors, which could maximise warning times are well illustrated in the histories of twentieth century conflicts,'

'the lead time to a force expansion is highly dependent on the assumptions made about warning time, the nature of the threat and the base force.'

'the use of explicit assumptions based on expert judgements which take account of both the national and global implications of warning times and threats would greatly improve our understanding of force expansion processes. This approach might also provide a positive feedback to the Strategic Basis and thus further clarify its broad strategic concepts. Certainly, this approach would represent an improvement to the existing method of estimating timings, which appear to be generally intuitive.'

'It is worth recalling that the definition of warning time consists of three basic elements:

- a. Government acceptance of a perceived threat
- b. Judgement on the time at which an operational response is required
- c. Implementation of relevant measures to meet the threat.

Element a. alone defines the commencement of warning time. Element b. is as vital as element a. in that it defines the duration of warning time and hence determines the relevance or otherwise of measures taken to expand the force...Since the concept of lead-time is closely related to the concept of warning time, the latter clearly warrants close examination in order to establish its validity for future situations.' and

'It must be stressed that the concept of warning time is fundamental to the value of lead-time estimations, which however accurate, would be meaningless if the concept of warning time was invalid. The relationships between projected threats and warning times therefore warrants critical consideration.'

CSE Force Expansion Study

- 7. Early in 1974 a draft outline of a task description of a Central Studies Establishment study entitled 'Limited Study of Critical Factors in Force Expansion' was prepared. This study was seen as a development from the Lead Time Pilot Study. This force expansion study was finally reported on in CSE Working Paper FORCEX 1 of 21 May 1974.
- 8. It included the previous definition of warning time, and introduced the new concept of perception time which it defined as:

'The time taken by a Government from its first recognition of a potentially unstable international climate, to its positive identification of the specific threat to its security.'

9. The working paper also acknowledged that both perception and warning times were critical factors in force expansion and Annex A to the FORCEX 1 Working Paper, listed provisional figures of estimated durations of perception and warning times for fifteen conflicts.

- 10. Thus the initial reason for carrying out historical analysis of warning times was in support of CSE's Force Expansion Study. This support was largely exploratory at this stage. Other classified force expansion and variation studies have continued at CSE to the present, but warning and perception times were not part of the reported results. The study of warning times was pursued as a separate study, but it was always seen in the context of force expansion lead-times and for this reason the study restricted itself to examination of past situations ending in conflict requiring operational response.
- 11. In the intellectual atmosphere of statements and views summarized above in paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 9, the study of warning time was seen as contributing to the following objectives:
 - a. supporting force expansion studies being carried out by CSE;
 - b. meeting the expressed need to further develop the concept of warning time, in as much as it was essential to lead-time studies;
 - c. examining the validity of the concept of warning time;
 - d. investigating to what degree the subject of warning time is amenable to meaningful analysis;
 - refining methods of estimating perception and warning times; and
 - f. determining the duration of various phases of warning times in comparatively recent conflicts for comparison with estimates of lead-times in different circumstances.

CSE Warning Time 1 Study

12. The further historical study of a larger sample of conflicts (twenty-three in all) was reported in CSE Working Paper, 'An Analysis of Warning Periods associated with Major Conflicts 1939-1973' (Warning Time 1), of December 1975. That working paper examined the periods preceding the point at which nations had become involved in major conflicts. It determined the perceptions held by the governments concerned and preparations these governments undertook and looked for underlying patterns in the historical record. Part of the process of looking for patterns and trends in the conflicts studied involved the quite extensive use of statistics. The statistical treatment suggested several ways in which the conflicts studied could be categorised and 'tested' a number of hypotheses.

13. Warning Time 1 was still seen as only an exploratory investigation. The results were felt to be promising and reassuringly consistent, but needed to be supplemented by further research. The conclusions were seen as being preliminary and tentative and provided for comment and discussion; this caveat was frequently overlooked.

CSE Threat Recognition and Response Study

- 14. In the years which followed the publication of Warning Time 1 the work was often quoted and misquoted, usually without acknowledging CSE. Because of this factor, coupled with the continuing interest within the Department of Defence, and the previously expressed opinion that the original study needed to be supplemented by further research, CSE decided in July 1979 to re-examine the original work with a view to presenting it eventually in a form suitable for formal publication as a research report.
- 15. The work was seen by Deputy Secretary B of that time to be sensitive but potentially useful and he recommended that it continue.
- 16. Study of warning times has continued intermittently and at low priority since July 1979. The number of case studies has been increased to thirty six, the methodology refined and the conceptual framework developed in more detail.
- 17. This note presents the results of the post 1979 study of warning times associated with thirty six case studies of conflicts occurring between 1938 and 1973. The case studies upon which the models developed in Volume 1 of this note are based, are provided in Volume 2. The case studies were selected with the aim of achieving a balance of different types of contingency situation and to have general comparative value by including Australian situations. The availability of adequate data was also a consideration. Case studies of events before 1938 were judged to be too remote in time to be of much appropriateness to the present day. At the time that major work on this study concluded (late 1981), 1973 was the latest period from which adequate historical data could be gathered.
- 18. The historical study of conflicts, revealed a number of underlying patterns and trends. These in turn suggested two principal descriptive frameworks in which discussion of these patterns and trends may be structured. Two such frameworks, or models, one of threat recognition, the other of defence activities in response to perceptions of threat, are proposed by this note. The remainder of Volume 1 of this note describes a model of threat recognition; and the activities of governments in response to their recognition of threat, with the time durations of the phases defined by the threat recognition model.

A PROCESS OF THREAT RECOGNITION

National Warning

- 19. Nations are dependent for their management and decision-making on large organisations. Thus the problem of national warning becomes initially a question of identifying which organisations are responsible for performing the different parts of the warning function i.e.
 - a. monitoring deterioration in strategic environment and circumstances; and/or
 - b. registering the threat of danger; and
 - c. initiating some form of reaction.
- 20. The normal candidate for the first two parts is the intelligence organisation of a national government. It attempts to recognise adverse strategic changes and emerging threats, determine their scope and form, and inform the government. The intelligence organisation does not usually hold any responsibility for the formulation and implementation of reactions.
- 21. For most nations, the organisations which fulfill the third part of the warning function are foreign affairs departments, and defence departments providing advice to government. Even though such departments collectively are the important ones in the formulation and implementation of appropriate responses to adverse changes in strategic circumstances and threats, they do not necessarily hold the executive power to select and initiate particular responses.
- In most political systems the executive power to select and initiate responses resides within the national government; e.g. the Cabinet, Politburo, or Presidency etc. These are the organisations which, as far as this study is concerned make the critical decisions on recognition and reaction to deteriorating strategic circumstances and emerging threats. For example, an intelligence organisation may be convinced of the existence of factors negatively affecting a nations security, but it may not be able to persuade the Cabinet to agree. If Cabinet chooses to ignore this warning, the foreign affairs and/or defence departments receive no orders to initiate some form of reaction to the possible danger. A warning which prompts no reaction to lessen the consequences of danger cannot be said to have been accepted by the Cabinet as a warning at all. It is just another piece of information. Nothing can be done without the link between the intelligence organisation and the executive departments. Thus the role of the Cabinet is crucial in deciding whether to accept the advice that a decline in a nation's strategic circumstances or a threat exists, and in determining the reaction to it. This study concentrates on the reactions of governments and their central organisations such as the Cabinet, Politburo etc.

23. The first two parts of the warning function cited above were monitoring deterioration in a nation's strategic circumstances and/or environment and the registering of a threat of danger. These beg the questions: in respect of what are a nation's strategic circumstances and/or environment deteriorating; and what is being threatened? In this respect, national governments think of their security in terms of national interests which this study defines as follows:

"National interests are the needs and desires of the nation as perceived by the government, particularly in relation to its environment and the other sovereign states which constitute that environment."

- 24. A Government does not always wait until a threat emerges to one or more of its national interests before it changes its defence forces. For example, if a government thinks it worthwhile to have defence forces, it often accepts also the need to keep them well equipped. In this situation the decision to replace old equipment is not necessarily related to any obvious threat, but to the need to maintain an efficient and credible defence force for general diplomatic effect and influence.
- 25. This study does not consider situations which arise as possible precursors to threat but instead focusses upon historical situations where an actual threat has started to emerge. A concept of threat which is used widely is the maxim that a threat exists to a national interest when another state has the Capability to attack the national interest, and also the Hostile Intent to do so.
- The ability of a national government to recognise Hostile Intents and Capabilities threatening national interests rests on the interpretation placed on available information gathered by the national intelligence organisation and others. The choice of an interpretation is a complicated process in which many factors can have an influence. The case studies of Volume 2 of the study describe this process in relation to particular governments involved in specific crises and conflicts. No attempt is made to generalise on the methods leading to a choice of an interpretation by a government, although many references in the case studies do address this aim with varying degrees of success. This study is less interested in why governments accept or reject interpretations of intelligence data on Hostile Intents and Capabilities, than in when governments decided such Hostile Intents and Capabilities existed.

Re-Definition of the Threat Maxim

27. The threat recognition maxim as stated is too simple to cope with much of the reality of practical intelligence assessments of threats to national interests. Such assessments are made regularly and revised as a threat is seen to become more, or less, menacing. Initial assessments may identify a hostile intent and capability, but the evidence may be weak. Later assessments may continue to identify a threat, but with

much more conviction and detail about its nature because of further evidence. This assessment of the existence of a threat is more likely to be accepted by a government, whereas earlier assessments may not have been. This view is supported by research in this study into crises and conflicts occurring since 1938, comprising the case studies. To be useful any prospective interpretation of the recognition of threat needs to be flexible enough to take account of the gradually changing importance a government places on the assessments it receives from its intelligence organisation.

- 28. From our examination of the patterns of threat recognition emerging from the case studies in Volume 2, it is suggested that the emergence of a threat over time can be described using the following concepts:
 - a. General Hostile Intent;
 - b. Specific Hostile Intent;
 - c. General Capability; and
 - d. Specific Capability

which are defined below.

General Hostile Intent

29. General Hostile Intent is defined as follows:

"A General Hostile Intent exists for a national government when it recognises that a particular state is disturbing the normal levels of international rivalry and disputation in regard to a particular issue, but cannot decide on the basis of available information whether this state will eventually focus its attention on one or another of the government's related national interests."

Specific Hostile Intent

- 30. Specific Hostile Intent is defined as follows:
 - "A Specific Hostile Intent exists for a national government when it recognises clearly defined motives and objectives for another state to challenge directly one or more of its national interests."
- 31. The preceding definitions of Intent help to distinguish between two elements of threat recognition which are sometimes confused. The first describes a state of relations somewhat more disturbed and fractious than normal international relations. Rivalry and disputation are common to the intercourse between national governments, but these are part of the process of peacefully outlining areas of interest and responsibility, and of developing compromises between states. A

General Hostile Intent is recognised when a national government feels that a particular state is disturbing normal rivalry and disputation beyond plausible and acceptable levels. However, the government cannot decide on the basis of available information whether the state will develop its disruptive activity and focus on one or more of the government's national interests.

- 32. The recognition of the second element (Specific Hostile Intent) outlines a much more distinct and serious level of intent and is based on a national government having determined to its own satisfaction the following:
 - a. the national interests under challenge;
 - b. the specific motives and political objectives for the opponent to challenge national interests;
 - c. the high level of political commitment of the opponent towards achieving his objectives;
 - d. the <u>general</u> geographic area of the challenge to national interests;
 - e. the probable timeframe within which the challenge might require an operational response (also dependent on an estimate of opponent's capability see paragraphs 34-37).
- 33. The last three factors are determined or inferred largely from the information associated with the identification of the national interests under challenge and the opponent's motive, and objectives.

General Capability

- 34. General Capability refers to some form of military and/or economic power. It is defined as follows:
 - "A General Capability exists when a national government recognizes that another state has acquired assets which if expanded and/or combined according to one or another strategy, can be deployed to a particular geographic area and menace directly one of the government's national interests."

Specific Capability

- 35. Specific Capability has been defined as follows:
 - "A Specific Capability exists when a national government recognizes that another state has created and deployed an appropriately tailored force which can thwart one or more of the government's national interests."

- 36. These aspects of capability can be confused. A nation with large standing forces might be conceived as having a Specific Capability to thwart a particular national interest. However unless such forces have been <u>organised</u> according to a credible military strategy, and <u>deployed</u> appropriately to strike at those objectives which will damage the opponent's national interest, only a General Capability can be said to exist.
- 37. The recognition of Specific Capability outlines a much more distinct and menacing level of capability, and is based on a national government having determined to its own satisfaction the following:
 - a. the national interests under challenge;
 - b. the compound characteristics of the combined assets used to create the Specific Capability;
 - c. the military strategy which governs the opponent's development and placement of assets and logistic infrastructure to menace national interests;
 - d. the <u>specific</u> geographic location at which operations might be attempted;
 - e. the probable timeframe within which the challenge might require an operational response (also dependent on an estimate of opponent's hostile intent see paragraphs 29-33).
- 38. On the basis of the patterns evident in the case studies, the recognition of a General Hostile Intent and General Capability are at separate points in time, but there is no obvious pattern in their order i.e. General Capability might be recognised in advance of General Hostile Intent. However, both are recognised before either a Specific Hostile Intent or a Specific Capability. The recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability are also at separate points in time, and there is no obvious pattern in the order of their recognition i.e. Specific Capability might well be recognised before a Specific Hostile Intent. The above relationships are summarised in Figure 1 "Points in the Threat Recognition Sequence".




Figure 1. POINTS IN THE THREAT RECOGNITION SEQUENCE

TIME

- 39. The recognition by a government of a General Hostile Intent and a General Capability identified a weak threat to national interests i.e. a Notional Threat. The case studies of Volume 2 showed governments realised that while this did not outline a clearly defined and imminent threat, nevertheless there was some latent menace in the situation which could emerge fully with the change of relatively few factors. The recognition of a General Hostile Intent or a General Capability was not regarded by governments as being important, probably because the omission of one or the other of these components did not describe even a weak threat.
- 40. The recognition by a government of a Specific Hostile Intent or a Specific Capability, as outlined in Figure 1, was the next major step in the sequence of threat recognition. Another way of expressing this relationship is to say that a General Hostile Intent had continued to be recognised, and that the General Capability had been superseded by the recognition of a Specific Capability; or that a General Capability had continued to be recognised, and that the General Hostile Intent had been superseded by the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent. As was mentioned before (Paragraphs 32 and 37) a government had received much more specific intelligence by the time it recognised a Specific Hostile Intent or a Specific Capability. In this respect its threat appreciation had advanced beyond that of a Notional Threat, and had become what this study has termed a Perceived Threat.
- 41. The recognition by a government of a Specific Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability, as outlined in Figure 1, was the last step in the sequence of threat recognition by a government. Another way of expressing this relationship is to say that a Specific Hostile Intent had continued to be recognised, and that the General Capability had been superseded by the recognition of a Specific Capability; or that a Specific Capability had continued to be recognised, and that the General Hostile Intent had been superseded by the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent. The government had specific information on all the major components of a serious threat (see paragraphs 32 and 37) and had recognised what this study has termed a Specific Threat to national interests.
- 42. Figure 2 "Different Classes of Threat in the Threat Recognition Sequence" summarises these concepts of threat.




Figure 2. DIFFERENT CLASSES OF THREAT IN THE THREAT RECOGNITION SEQUENCE

43. In the circumstance where a government failed to ameliorate or assuage a Specific Threat through diplomacy and/or deterrence, the Specific Threat continues until an Operational Response was begun either by the government or its adversary. An Operational Response is defined as follows:

"The commitment by governments of Combat forces to active operations, in order to protect their national interests, either through large scale manoeuvring or through hostilities."

- 44. For those historical cases in which an Operational Response became necessary at the end of the pattern of governmental threat recognition, it is possible to outline three preceding phases of threat:
 - a. the Notional Threat Phase;
 - b. the Perceived Threat Phase;
 - c. the Specific Threat Phase.
- 45. Figure 3: "The Threat Recognition Model" describes these phases. They correspond to the time intervals between the points at which governments recognised a General Hostile Intent and General Capability, a Specific Hostile Intent or a Specific Capability, a Specific Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability, and the beginning of an Operational Response. The durations corresponding to each phase can be ascertained from historical data which are recorded for each case study in Volume 2. Such durations are presented later.




Figure 3. THE THREAT RECOGNITION MODEL

Discussion of the Threat Recognition Phases

- There is nothing inexorable in the passage of one phase of threat recognition to the next through to an Operational Response. At any time, in any phase, the process of threat recognition can be stopped by a government assuaging the threat through diplomacy. While it is probably true to say that all governments will attempt to assuage emerging threats through non-military methods, occasionally they will not succeed. The case studies in Volume 2 are a record of examples where the threat recognition pattern was followed through to an Operational Response. Governments felt that threatened national interests were important enough to protect by force rather than to surrender them to an enemy. Such national interests deserve to be distinguished in some way from others and are called Primary national interests in this study. A list of these drawn from Volume 2, is given in Annex A. Primary national interests may be different from those national interests which are part of a dispute with another state which is eventually settled peacefully.
- 47. This study does not examine international disputes which were ameliorated peacefully, and it is probable that the time intervals for such threat phases as occurred for resolved disputes would not be the same as those examined in this study. In a sense, the study could be considered to examine those cases where nations $\frac{\text{failed}}{\text{fot}}$ to avert conflict. The point that is being made here is that the time intervals for threat phases, which this study estimates cannot in any meaningful sense be used to adduce likely time intervals for the majority of instances where conflict is avoided.

THE STATISTICS OF WARNING TIME

Introduction

- 48. The Threat Recognition Model described the phases of governmental perception of threats and provided a methodology for defining the beginning and end of the various threat recognition phases.
- 49. When the model was applied to the historical record, exemplified by the case studies, it facilitated the estimation (with varying degrees of precision) of the duration of the different threat recognition phases, leading up to a conflict involving an operational response. These durations are termed Threat Recognition Phase Durations and are listed in Table 1 for each of the conflicts studied.
- 50. The statistics of durations are further summarised in Table 2 and in Figures 4-6.

Table 1. THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES 1938-73

| CASE STUDY NUMBERS | CONFLICT OR CRI | sis | NATION STUDIED | NOTIONAL THREAT (weeks) | PERCEIVED THREAT (weeks) | SPECIFIC THREAT (weeks) ^{1,2} |
|--------------------------|------------------|------|-------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 1 | MUNICH PHASE 1 | 1938 | GERMANY | 109 | 138 | 44 |
| 2 | MUNICH PHASE 2 | 1938 | BRITAIN | 104 | 131 | 4 |
| 3 | DANZIG PHASE 1 | 1939 | POLAND | 832 | 117 | 63 |
| 4 | | | GERMANY | 114 | 18 | 22 |
| 5 | DANZIG PHASE 2 | 1939 | GERMANY | 1040 | 21 | 1 |
| 6 | | | BRITAIN | - | 24 | 24 |
| 7 | NORWAY | 1940 | NORWAY | 16 | 1 | 0* |
| 8 | | | GERMANY | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| 9 | | | BRITAIN | 4 | 6 | 9 |
| 10 | BERLIN BLOCKADE | 1948 | USA | 140 | 14 | 0* |
| 11 | | | USSR | 73 | 35 | 16 |
| 12 | KASHMIR | 1948 | PAKISTAN | 16 | 1 | 0* |
| 13 | | | INDIA | 5 | 3 | 0* |
| 14 | KOREA PHASE 1 | 1950 | SOUTH KOREA | 42 | 43 | 43 |
| 15 | KOREA PHASE 2 | 1950 | USA | 47 | 86 | 0* |
| 16 | | | AUSTRALIA | 1 | 4 | 0* |
| 17 | KOREA PHASE 3 | 1950 | CHINA | 195 | 13 | 4 |
| 18 | | | USA | 16 | 3 | O * |
| 19 | SUEZ PHASE 2 | 1956 | FRANCE | 42 | 30 | 30 |
| 20 | | | EGYPT | 47 | 15 | 13 |
| 21 | SUEZ PHASE 3 | 1956 | BRITAIN | 10 | 21 | 14 |
| 22 | | | EGYPT | 32 | 4 | 10 |
| 23 | SINO-INDIA | 1962 | CHINA | 68 | 65 | 29 |
| 24 | | | INDIA | 156 | 53 | 0* |
| 25 | CONFRONTATION | 1963 | BRITAIN | 260 | 9 | 8 |
| 26 | | | AUSTRALIA | 57 | 20 | 29 |
| 25 | | | INDONESIA | 260 | 3 | 8 |
| 27 | VIETNAM | 1964 | USA | 390 | 104 | 58 |
| 28 | | | AUSTRALIA | 390 | 106 | 48 |
| 29 | Kashmir | 1965 | PAKISTAN | 21 | 23 | 32 |
| 30 | | | INDIA | 94 | 12 | 3 |
| 31 | WAR OF ATTRITION | 1969 | ISRAEL | 10 | 60 | 19 |
| 32 | | | EGYPT | <u>-</u> | 56 | 27 |
| 33 | EAST PAKISTAN | 1971 | PAKISTAN | 5 | 18 | 15 |
| 34 | | | INDIA | 2 | 9 | 20 |
| 35 | ARAB ISRAEL WAR | 1973 | ISRAEL | - | 164 | 0* |
| 36 | i | | EGYPT | - | 49 | 105 |
| | | | | | | |

Notes

- These durations have been rounded to the nearest whole number of weeks for presentation purposes. Thus they may still imply a precision not achieved by the study. For detailed justification of the duration, the reader is referred to Volume 2, Case Studies.
- A 0* in the column indicates a rounding to zero when the duration was 0.5 week or less.

Table 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS - THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS

| SUMMARY STATISTIC | NOTIONAL THREAT PHASE (weeks) | PERCEIVED THREAT PHASE (weeks) | SPECIFIC THREAT PHASE (weeks) |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|
| Mean Duration | 140 | 40 | 19 |
| Median Duration | 47 | 21 | 13 |
| Standard Deviation (sample) | 229 | 44 | 22 |
| Interquartile Range | 135 | 52 | 28 |




Figure 4. FREQUENCY HISTOGRAMS OF THREAT RECOGNITION PHASE DURATIONS




Figure 5. SAMPLE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR NOTIONAL THREAT PHASE DURATIONS




Figure 6. SAMPLE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCEIVED AND SPECIFIC THREAT PHASE DURATIONS

Objective Use of Warning Time Statistics

- 51. The case studies found in Volume 2 have been drawn from the historical data for past events. These events were significant international conflicts and crises occurring between 1938 and 1973. The selection of the conflicts studied (see paragraph 17) was not based upon random sampling but upon a desire to deal with examples of as many types of conflict as practicable and in particular those involving Australia (ie Case Studies 16, 26, 28 of Vol 2). Because the conflicts studied did not result from a process of random sampling it is inevitable that some biases may be present in a statistical sense and consequently the threat recognition phase durations cannot be said to be properly representative of all significant international crises in the period 1938 to 1973.
- 52. Furthermore, because all the case studies chosen were of situations which ended in conflict, the Threat Recognition Phase Durations constitute a class of observations <u>conditional</u> upon conflict occurring.
- 53. Because of the problems of non-random sampling, and biases, it is not possible to apply the objective techniques of statistical inference to the threat recognition phase durations. Thus questions as to whether long or short durations were associated with nations in high or low tension areas, or with nations involved in high or low level conflicts, or with nations which were geographically proximate or remote, cannot be answered definitively by statistical manipulation of the durations in Table 1.
- 54. The above caveat also applies to any attempt to use the threat recognition phase durations to predict warning times for future conflicts. It is not the intention of this study to attempt such a prediction, though it was a consideration that the threat recognition model might be a useful concept to assist defence planners.

Subjective Use of Warning Time Statistics

- 55. There does appear to be some scope for the subjective use of warning time statistics, not directly involving the employment of the classical statistical approach. These uses fall into two main categories, namely:
 - a. the use of warning time statistics as indicators of underlying patterns or trends; and
 - b. the use of warning time statistics in corroborating or increasing the acceptability of or enhancing a degree-of-belief in a point of view, theory or attitude.

- The use of warning time statistics as aids to judgement has an analogy in the way that Intelligence analyses and reflects on incomplete, non-experimental data to draw inferences or conclusions in regard to the strategic and tactical environment in which it is embedded. Trends or patterns are discerned by quite complex cognitive and subjective processes, involving the data themselves, the perceived relevance, reliability, significance and accuracy of such data, their collation and finally their interpretation and discernment of their potential consequences. Intelligence information obtained in this way is usually the basis for the initial threat perceptions of governments.
- 57. Information may also be used to increase or decrease one's degree-of-belief in a theory, attitude or point of view. Such use of data is widespread in the areas of inference and decision-making.
- 58. Controversy is inevitable in these fields of inference and decision-making, and it is not a primary aim of this study to state a preference for any particular inferential approach. This note does not pursue further any analysis or reflection upon the threat recognition phase durations but instead leaves it to the reader to draw his own inferences and conclusions. The results of the study are nonetheless given in the hope that they may suggest possible courses of action and may provide some useful insights in this complex area. They are also presented so that they may be compared with force expansion lead-times, as this comparison was one of the main reasons for warning time studies in the first instance. In what follows, the nature of response by governments observed in the case studies is developed further in terms of defence activities etc.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE SEQUENCES OF THREAT RECOGNITION

Introduction

- 59. It has been mentioned (in Paragraph 19) that the warning function includes not only the <u>registering</u> of the threat of danger, but also initiating some form of <u>reaction</u> to lessen the danger. Without such a reaction to the different classes of threat (i.e. Notional, Perceived and Specific) of the sequence of threat recognition, it is not possible to say that a government has accepted that those classes of threat exist at all. The case studies in Volume 2 of this study identify when governments recognised the different classes of threat, and also the defence and non-defence responses which were made to lessen the danger, inherent in the threats.
- 60. The historical information summarised in Volume 2 of this note gives support for the sequence of threat recognition adopted in the study, as such responses appear to have differed depending on the class of threat identified. Based on the case studies of Volume 2, a general description and explanation for the type of response by governments for each class of threat is now given.

61. The ideal reaction of most governments in the face of even a weak threat would be to take sufficient diplomatic and defence counter measures to provide as complete security as possible. However, governments were restricted in these "ideal" responses by many factors which were related to the different classes of threat in the sequence of threat recognition.

Activities Associated with Notional Threat

- 62. The constraints to government reaction to a Notional Threat arose from the nature of a General Hostile Intent and a General Capability. The information associated with the recognition of a General Hostile Intent did not enable a government to be sure which national interest could eventually be the focus of another state's hostile activities. Some doubt was removed when, in addition, a General Capability was recognised because the government's perception of the number and nature of national interests under possible threat could be refined. However, there was still great uncertainty. The government did not know that the competing state was intent on opposing a particular national interest, and could not be sure how the competing state would adjust and deploy its assets to menace the same national interest.
- 63. This uncertainty had implications for the diplomatic and defence activities a government undertook in response to a Notional Threat. Diplomacy was affected in that it could not be based on the certainty of serious hostility requiring a vigorous and pointed diplomatic response. Such a response ran the risk of aggravating the situation when a General Hostile Intent had been recognised. Consequently diplomacy was not likely to be a powerful aid at the level of Notional Threat as it had to be low key and exploratory.
- A government's defence activities were similarly affected. The recognition of a General Capability meant that the government had identified means by which the competing state could develop and deploy a force to menace a national interest. A natural reaction was for the government to develop and deploy such counter forces as would ensure the protection of the particular national interest from such menace. However, the creation of these counter forces before the recognition by the government of a Specific Capability, left the competing state the opportunity to adjust its strategy and hence the development and deployment of its forces, so that the effectiveness of the counter forces was undermined. More importantly, the ostentatious development of counter forces during a Notional Threat phase could aggravate what might have remained a benign situation, creating the early stages of an Arms Race. These reasons tended to influence a government's willingness to pursue vigorously defence activities. Defence activities were undertaken cautiously with circumspection. See for example Case Studies 2, 11, 23 & 30 of Volume 2.

- 65. Another reason apparent from the case studies of Volume 2, as to why governments were inclined to exercise caution in their response to a Notional Threat, was the high cost of defence activities particularly when force development or expansion was involved. In most states this created a conflict with the desire to expend finance on competing government objectives such as social and economic goals. Democratic governments leave themselves exposed to serious opposition and criticism if they attempt to increase defence spending significantly in response to a Notional Threat. This level of threat was not serious and consequently governments experienced difficulty in justifying to their populations why a significant defence response was necessary. It was logical for them to continue the existing expenditure policies, because in the final analysis this retained more political support. Totalitarian governments experienced something of the same dilemma, although criticism was made by competing factions within the single party organisational structure, and not in public. Examples of the above observations for Notional Threat can be found in Case Studies 2, 10, 15 and 17 of Volume 2.
- 66. Another reason why governments exercised caution in responses to a Notional Threat was that most Notional Threats were assuaged before they developed into Perceived Threats. Sometimes this was because of the effects of low key diplomacy and sometimes because of unexpected international events which changed the relevance of regional international politics. Governments knew from their own experience that they could take few active responses to a Notional Threat, and yet have the reasonable expectation that the threat would be ameliorated.
- 67. As might be expected, little defence activity took place in response to a Notional Threat. Most effort went into increased planning so that implications of certain courses of action in response to possible actions by the competing state could be understood. Within the existing defence force expenditure there was a change of emphasis to assets which the government was reasonably certain would be important no matter what course of action was taken by the competing state to develop a capability to menace the government's national interest.

Activities Associated with Perceived Threat

- 68. The constraints to government reaction to a Perceived Threat were less than for a Notional Threat because there was more information on which the government could base decisions. But as will be shown, the constraints were still significant.
- 69. As already indicated, the profile of a Percieved Threat was the recognition of a General Capability and Specific Hostile Intent, or a General Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability.

- 70. In the former case a General Hostile Intent had been superseded by a Specific Hostile Intent; and as stated previously this meant the government had determined the national interest under challenge, the specific motives and political objectives of the competitor state, the state's level of political commitment, and the general geographic area of the challenge. Therefore, in so far as intent was concerned, the full problem had been largely revealed to the government, and it could now launch a well directed diplomatic offensive to assuage the Specific Hostile Intent.
- 71. Governments generally accepted that the effectiveness of diplomacy could often be enhanced if it were supported by a demonstration of armed strength aimed at deterring an opponent from a course of action. This and the natural desire to take defence measures in the face of a threat, were the reasons why governments wished to develop and deploy their defence forces in response to a Perceived Threat.
- However, as explained for a Notional Threat, the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent accompanied only by a General Capability did not provide the government with enough information to launch a well directed defence development and deployment. The danger of developing an inappropriate force structure restricted defence activities by governments to the active preparation of those assets which seemed to have wide utility no matter what the competing state attempted. In contrast with the Notional Threat Phase, this entailed a real increase in defence expenditure, but the creation and configuration of a force tailored to meet the appropriate military contingency had to wait until the recognition of a Specific Capability. Examples of the above factors for this type of Perceived Threat are Case Studies 5,7,9, and 10. An example of a government ignoring the constraints for this form of Perceived Threat is Case Study 35.
- 73. When a Perceived Threat was based on the recognition of a Specific Capability and a General Hostile Intent, uncertainty was reduced for the government in relation to possible operations, but significant doubt remained about the intent of the competing state to launch such operations. The government had determined the national interest under challenge, the compound characteristics of the assets to be used by the competing state, the state's strategy and the specific geographic location of the contingency. Therefore, in so far as capability was concerned, the full problem had been largely revealed to the government, and it could launch well directed defence activities designed to ameliorate the Specific Capability.
- 74. However, without some specific indications on intent, the nature of the capability could still be ambiguous. The Specific Capability identified by the government might have been able to threaten a national interest, but it may also have been constructed for other purposes by the competing state such as its own legitimate security. The development and deployment of defence forces in a certain way by a competing state in other

words satisfied two or more circumstances. It was a common characteristic of defence forces that they were often able to carry out more than just the operation for which they might have been especially developed and deployed, and this ambiguity was often impossible to resolve without some clear indication of the competing state's intentions. This was lacking with the recognition of a General Hostile Intent because this gave only vague indications of intent.

- 75. The consequences of developing the defence forces necessary to give a very high level of security against the Specific Capability, without establishing properly the real purpose of the Specific Capability, was that the government could be creating a security dilemma for the competing state. For example, having created defence forces for a variety of reasons not necessarily related to threatening the government's national interests, the competing state could perceive the government's elaborate defence preparations as directed against the competing state's national security. The competing state could be encouraged to take further defence measures, appearing to provide evidence which justified the government's fears. With action and reaction between the government and the competing state, a regional arms race could begin which could often involve other states as they found their security compromised through the ambiguous nature of the military capabilities being developed by the government and the competing state. Opportunities for diplomacy could become entangled in problems of arms control and mutual security, reducing the scope for peaceful settlement. Fear of this consequence could then lead governments to be circumspect in defence activities for a Perceived Threat containing a Specific Capability. Some examples of governments responding to the constraints for this form of Perceived Threat are Case Studies 2, 6, and 17. An example of such constraints being ignored, and the consequences, is contained in Case Studies 29 and 30.
- The defence developments and deployments which were tenable for the government for this form of Perceived Threat were those which were unambiguously for self defence and did not pose a direct military menace to the established national interests of the competitor state. In contrast with the Notional Threat Phase, this entailed a real increase in national defence expenditure, but this was a long way short of giving defence activities first priority in government expenditure. Even within this framework, defence activities for this form of Perceived Threat (Specific Capability and General Hostile Intent) as well as for the other form (Specific Hostile Intent and General Capability) were both constrained by political and economic factors. For reasons which were similar to those for Notional Threat, the bulk of existing expenditure on social and economic objectives had to be maintained because the government could not point to a threat which was clear and specific in all aspects of threat recognition.

77. In spite of the observed restrictions on defence activities for both forms of Perceived Threat there were sometimes circumstances permitting the development of defence assets having some deterrent effect on the competing state during the Perceived Threat phase. Development of deterrent assets had to be undertaken with care, to avoid posing any direct threat to the competing state's established national interests, and to avoid accusations of starting an arms race. Such developments reinforced diplomacy by demonstrating the will of the Government to consider serious defence options, and further were a latent threat of the possible imposition of higher military and financial costs on the competing state in the future. (see Case Study 30).

Activities Associated with the Specific Threat Phase

- 78. A Specific Threat was defined earlier as the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability by the government. This meant that the government had received sufficient intelligence information to remove most of the uncertainty on both intent and capability of the competing state. A pointed and vigorous diplomatic campaign could be conducted to assuage the Specific Hostile Intent with little fear that it might be misdirected. Defence activities could be launched to counter the Specific Capability without the previous problem of ambiguity, because this had been resolved by the recognition of a Specific Hostile Intent.
- The object of such defence activities had also changed. The government no longer restricted its activities to consideration of serious defence options as in the Perceived Threat Phase, but sought to support its diplomacy by demonstrating its intention to $\underline{\text{fight}}$ in support of national interests. The aim was to deter the competing state by showing the inevitability of heavy losses and costs if it continued on its course and ignored diplomacy. In effect, the government sought to create a force which had the capability to at least defend the threatened national interest, and other possible targets, for the first few weeks of a war. Some caution in defence activities still needed to be exercised to avoid escalating the level of the dispute by directly threatening the security of the competing state, unless this were unavoidable in order to protect the government's national interest. Similarly some regard had to be shown for other neighboring states which might feel that excessive military preparations, by the government, threatened their security as well, causing them to participate in a regional arms race.
- 80. During a Specific Threat Phase, governments were also in a much better position than previously to gain public support for high defence expenditure, because the threat was now clearly defined and menacing. There was less scope for claims that the government's response was exaggerated. Political constraints on the government were much less of a hindrance to the placing of

defence as the first priority in government expenditure. For this and the other reasons stated, the Specific Threat Phase was historically the most important threat recognition phase for defence activities. These exceeded greatly the defence activities for the Notional Threat Phase and the Perceived Threat Phase. All case studies in Volume 2 give evidence to support this view.

Duration of Specific Threat -Phase

- 81. While the Specific Threat Phases were the most important and intense for defence activities, these, as a group, were short compared with the other threat recognition phases (see Table 2).
- 82. Within this context, there were particular Specific Threat Phase durations which were extremely short when compared with the group of Specific Threat Phase durations resulting from this study (see Table 1). In these instances, the relevant case studies revealed that governments either did not receive sufficient warning signals (for example Case Studies 2, 10) or that where sufficient warning signals were available, governments misinterpreted these signals (for example Case Studies 5, 7, 15, 24, 35).

SUMMARY

- 83. From an analysis of the patterns of behaviour exhibited by national governments, a model of the processes of threat recognition by governments has been developed.
- 84. The analysis was based on 36 case studies of international conflicts and crises occurring between 1938 and 1973. The data contained in the case studies, supported the threat recognition sequence outlined in the threat recognition model.
- 85. This threat recognition model described the sequential phases of threat recognition by governments, during which government perceptions of threat gradually became more precise and detailed. The first phase, called the Notional Threat Phase was associated with the first, vague, ill-defined premonitions of an emerging threat. The second phase, the Perceived Threat Phase, was associated with a government's clear recognition of either a General Capability together with a Specific Hostile Intent or a General Hostile Intent together with a Specific Capability, directed against one or more of its national interests. The last phase, the Specific Threat Phase, was associated with a government's recognition of both a Specific Hostile Intent and a Specific Capability to harm one or more of its national interests.

- 86. In all the cases of conflict and crises studied, national governments for various reasons did not conduct extensive defence preparations in response to the perceived threat during either the Notional or Perceived Threat Phases.
- 87. The situation for the Specific Threat Phase was different. The recognition of both a Specific Hostile Intent and Specific Capability meant that from its own point of view a government had received sufficient information to justify, both economically and politically, large scale defence preparations. These preparations in turn could be tailored appropriately to meet what was now believed to be a quite probable and imminent threat.
- 88. Historically the Specific Threat Phase was the most important threat recognition phase for defence preparation activities (which included expansion and enhanced operational readiness and sustainability of key front line and support units, and increased munitions production). The Specific Threat Phase, was generally much shorter than either the Notional or Perceived Threat Phases.
- 89. The threat recognition phase durations recorded in this note complement equipment lead-times and force expansion time estimates. They can <u>not</u> be used for objective statistical prediction of warning times of future conflicts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the following who with him researched and wrote the Case Studies of Volume 2 of this note, namely Dr E.A.J. Duyker, CMDR B. Ledlie, Dr T.J. O'Rourke, Mr J. Popple, and LTCOL W.D. Thomas.

Annex A

CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST FOR CONFLICTS AND CRISES 1938-73

- 1. The Primary National Interests which were identified by governments involved in the conflicts and crises between 1938-73 (including Australian governments) in this study fall into four categories which are listed below:
 - a. <u>Category 1</u>. Interests relating to preservation of the sovereign territory (and independence) of the homeland from foreign military interference.
 - b. <u>Category 2</u>. Interests relating to the preservation of the state's political system and its internal stability.
 - c. <u>Category 3</u>. Interests relating to the maintenance of the state's economic position and economic viability.
 - d. <u>Category 4</u>. Interests relating to the maintenance of the state's political and military position and influence in the world.
- 2. Table Al presents a list of Primary National Interests compiled from the case studies in Volume 2 of this study.

Table Al. CATALOGUE OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS UNDER THREAT

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST CA | TEGORY |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--|--------|
| GERMANY | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | MUNICH 1938 PHASE 1 | 1. REVISION OF VERSAILLES TREATY MILITARY PROVISIONS | 1 |
| | | - | 2. CREATION OF GREATER GERMANY | 4 |
| | | | 3. ACQUISITION OF LEBENSRAUM (LIVING SPACE) IN EASTERN EUROPE | 3 |
| BRITAIN | GERMANY | MUNICH 1938 PHASE 2 | FACILITATION OF THE PEACEFUL REVISION OF THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND THE CONSEQUENT ENSURING OF THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE | 4 |
| POLAND | GERMANY | DANZIG 1939 PHASE 1 | SECURITY OF DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR | 1 |
| GERMANY | POLAND | DANZIG 1939 PHASE 1 | 1. SECURITY OF THE EASTERN PROVINCES OF GERMANY | 1 |
| | | | 1. REVINITION OF THE TERFITORIES LOST TI POLANT AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAS | 4 |
| | | | THE ACCUSETION OF LEBENSHAUF | 3 |
| BRITAIN | GERMANY | DANZIG 1939 PHASE 1 | 1. INDEPENDENCE OF THE LOW COUNTELLS | 1 |
| | | | 1. PRESERVATION OF THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER | 4 |

Table Al (Cont'd). CATALOGUE OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS UNDER THREAT

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRI | MARY NATIONAL INTEREST | CATEGORY |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----|---|--------------|
| GERMANY | BRITAIN AND FR AN CE | DANZIG 1939 PHASE 2 | 1. | SECURITY OF GERMANY'S INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND, THE RUHR VALLEY INDUSTRIAL BASIN | 1 |
| | | | 2. | REVINDICATION OF THE TERRITORIES LOST TO POLAND AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR | · 4 · |
| | | | 3. | ACQUISITION OF LEBENSRAUM | 3 |
| BRITAIN | GERMANY | NORWAY 1940 | 1. | PREVENTION OF GERMAN ACQUISITION OF AIR AND NAVAL BASES IN NORWAY TO INTERDICT BRITISH SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS | 3 |
| | | | 2. | PREVENTION OF GERMANY SECURING ITS IRON ORE SUPPLIES | 4 |
| | | | 3. | PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FINLAND | 4 |
| GERMANY | BRITAIN FRANCE AND NORWAY | NORWAY 1940 | 1. | MAINTENANCE OF THE WINTER IRON ORE ROUTE FROM SWEDEN VIA NARVIK IN NORWAY DOWN THROUGH NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS TO GERMANY | 3 |
| | | | 2. | SECURITY OF THE VITAL IRON ORE SUPPLIES FROM SWEDEN | 3 |

Table Al (Cont'd). CATALOGUE OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS UNDER THREAT

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST C | ATEGORY |
|--|--|-------------------------|---|---------|
| NORWAY | GERMANY | NORWAY 1940 | 1. PRESERVATION OF NORWEGIAN NEUTRALITY | 1 |
| | | | 2. SECURITY OF NORWAY | 1 |
| PAKISTAN | INDIA | KASHMIR 1948 | INCORPORATION OF KASHMIR (A STATE IN WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION ARE MUSLIMS) INTO PAKISTAN | 2 |
| AIDNI | PAKISTAN | KASHMIR 1948 | A KASHMIR THAT WAS RESPONSIVE TO INDIAN INFLUENCE | 2 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (BRITAIN AND FRANCE) | USSR | BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948 | WESTERN ORIENTATION OF GERMANY | 4 |
| USSR | WESTERN POWERS (UNITED STATES BRITAIN AND FRANCE) | BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948 | A GERMANY RESPONSIVE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND NOT THREATENING TO THE SECURITY OF THE USSR | 1 |
| SOUTH KOREA | NORTH KOREA | KOREA 1950 PHASE 1 | 1. SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA | 1 |
| | | | 2. SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH KOREA | 2 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | NORTH KOREA AND 'THE COMMUNIST WORLD' | KOREA 1950 PHASE 2 | 1. UPHOLDING THE AUTHORITY AND ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY FOR THE FREE (NON-COMMUNIST) WORLD | 4 |
| | | | 2. SURVIVAL OF SOUTH KOREA AS A NON-COMMUNIST AND PRO-WESTERN NATION | 4 |

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST CA | ATEGORY |
|-----------------------------|--|-----------------------|---|---------|
| AUSTRALIA | NORTH KOREA AND 'THE COMMUNIST WORLD' | KOREA 1950 PHASE 2 | 1. SECURITY OF AUSTRALIA'S REGION AND INTERESTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AGAINST THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM | 4 |
| | | | 2. THE SECURING OF AN AUSTRALIAN-US PACIFIC DEFENCE PACT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR AUSTRALIA AND HER INTERESTS | 1 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | CEINA | KOREA 1950 PHASE 3 | REUNIFICATION OF KOREA | 4 |
| CHINA | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | KOREA 1950 PHASE 3 | SECURITY OF THE MANCHURIAN INDUSTRIAL BASIN. | 1 |
| | | | RECAPTURE OF FORMOSA AND THE FINAL DEFEAT OF THE NATIONALISTS. | 2 |
| EGYPT | FRANCE | SUEZ 1956 PHASE 2 | INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT FROM THE INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN POWERS. | 1 |
| | | | 2. SECURITY FROM ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION. | 1 |
| FRANCE | EGYPT | SUE2 1956 PHASE 2 | MAINTENANCE OF FRENCH RULE IN ALGERIA. | 2 |
| egypt | BRITAIN | SUEZ 1956 PHASE 3 | INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT FROM FOREIGN CONTROL AND INFLUENCE. | 1 |

Table Al (Cont'd). CATALOGUE OF PRIMARY NATIONAL INTERESTS UNDER THREAT

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRI | MARY NATIONAL INTEREST | CATEGORY |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----|--|----------|
| BRITAIN | EGYPT | SUEZ 1956 PHASE 3 | 1. | MAINTENANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF THE SUEZ CANAL. | 4 |
| | | | 2. | SECURITY OF BRITAIN'S OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. | 3 |
| CHINA | INDIA | SINO-INDIA 1962 | 1. | SECURITY OF TIBET FROM SUBVERSION. | 2 |
| | | | 2. | SECURITY OF CHINA FROM A COORDINATED ATTACK FROM TAIWAN AND INDIA | 1 |
| INDIA | CHINA | SINO-INDIA 1962 | TER | TECTION OF SOVEREIGN RITORY FROM NESE ANNEXATION. | 1 |
| AUSTRALIA | INDONESIA | CONFRONTATION 1963 | 1. | SECURITY OF AUSTRALIA AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA. | 1 |
| | | | 2. | MAINTENANCE OF THE STABILIZED POWER CONFIGURATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE THERE | |
| BRITAIN AND MALAYSIA | INDONESIA | CONFRONTATION 1963 | | SECURITY OF AYSIA | 1 |

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST CATEGORY |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------------|--|
| INDONESIA | BRITAIN AND MALAYSIA (AND AUSTRALIA) | -CONFRONTATION 1963 | 1. PREVENTION OF THE 3 ESTABLISHMENT OF NEO-COLONIALISM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA |
| | | | 2. CREATION OF A 4 PAN-MALAY CONFEDERATION COMPETSING INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND THE PHILLIPINES (MAPHILINDO) |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | NORTH VIETNAM, OTHER VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND 'THE COMMUNIST WORLD' | VIETNAM 1964 | 1. MAINTENANCE OF CONTROL 4 OF THE EASTERN ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN IN NON-COMMUNIST HANDS. |
| | | | 2. PREVENTION OF THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE PHILLIPINES AND JAPAN AND THE DOMINATION OF INDONESIA, THROUGE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN SOUTE EAST ASIA. |
| AUSTRALIA | NORTH VIETNAM, OTHER VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND 'THE COMMUNIST WORLD' | VIETNAM 1964 | 1. SECURITY OF 4 AUSTRALIA'S REGION AND INTERESTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA FROM THE SPREAT OF COMMUNISM. |
| | | | 2. MAINTENANCE AND 1 STRENGTHENING OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ALLIANCE WITH AMERICA AND THE ENSURING OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR AUSTRALIA AND HER INTERESTS. |

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST | CATEGORY |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--|----------|
| PAKISTAN | INDIA | RASHMIR 1965 | INCORPORATION OF KASHMIR INTO THE STATE OF PAKISTAN. | 2 |
| INDIA | PAKISTAN | KASHMIR 1965 | MAINTENANCE OF INDIAN TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE NORTH-WEST OF THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT (I.E. INDIAN-HELD RASHMIR, LADAKH). | 1 |
| ISRAEL | EGYPT | WAR OF ATTRITION | 1. SECURITY OF ISRAEL | 1 |
| | | 1969 | 2. SECURITY OF PEACE SETTLEMENT | 4 |
| EGYPT | ISRAEL | WAR OF ATTRITION | 1. SECURITY OF EGYPTIAN HEARTLAND | 1 |
| | | | 2. RECAPTURE OF LOST TERRITORY AND SUE2 CANAL | 3 |
| PAKISTAN | INDIA | EAST PAKISTAN 1971 | TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE PAKISTANI NATION. | 1 |
| INDIA | PAKISTAN | EAST PAKISTAN 1971 | MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER IN THE STRATEGICALLY CRITICAL PROVINCES ON THE WESTERN AND NORTHERN BORDERS OF EAST PAKISTAN (NOW BANGLADESH). | 2 |
| ISRAEL | EGYPT | YOM KIPPUR 1973 | 1. SECURITY OF ISRAEL | 1 |
| | | | 2. PROTECTION OF ISRAELS MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRE-EMINENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. | 4 |

| COUNTRY FACING THREAT | COUNTRY POSING THREAT | CRISIS/CONFLICT | PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST CATEGORY |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--|
| EGYPT | ISRAEL | YOM KIPPUR 1973 | 1. SECURITY OF EGYPT 1 |
| | | 1973 | 2. RECAPTURE OF LOST 3 TERRITORY AND SUEZ CANAL. |

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16 Abstract This note is published as two Volumes. Volume I describes a model of threat recognition based upon patterns and trends discerned from a study of major international crises and conflicts which occurred in the period 1938 to 1973. It also describes, in broad terms, the diplomatic and defence preparation activities which national governments undertook in response to their threat perceptions. Finally, Volume I records and discusses the durations of the various threat recognition phases defined in the threat recognition model, and lists in Annex A the primary national interests identified by governments in the conflicts studied and for which they ultimately fought. Volume 2 documents the historical analysis of the case studies of international conflicts between 1938 and 1973 upon which the model and results of Volume 1 are based.

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